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Abstract
This paper proposes a measure of financial fragility that is based on eco-
nomic welfare in a general equilbrium model calibrated against UK data. The
model comprises a household sector, three active heterogeneous banks, a cen-
tral bank/regulator, incomplete markets, and endogenous default. We address
the impact of monetary and regulatory policy, credit and capital shocks in the
real and financial sectors and how the response of the economy to shocks re-
lates to our measure of financial fragility. Finally we use panel VAR techniques
to investigate the relationships between the factors that characterise financial
fragility in our model, i.e. banks’ probabilities of default and banks’ profits -
to a proxy of welfare.
Keywords: Financial fragility, Banks, Regulatory policy, Monetary pol-
icy, Equilibrium analysis.
JEL classification: C33, C68, E4, E5, G11, G21.
1 Introduction
If everyone always paid their debts in full and at the due date, there would be
little, or no, need for commercial banks. Everyone would then have the highest
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wish to thank course participants at the Centre for Central Banking Studies, Bank of England,
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possible credit-rating, would need no monitoring, and could borrow, or lend, at the
default-free rate of interest. Although many formal macro-economic models (implic-
itly) employ an assumption of a default-free system in their so-called transversality
assumption, it is not, alas, a characteristic of the real world.
Indeed, the probability of default (PD) is a key concept in any analysis of fi-
nancial fragility. It is, of course, central to the Basel II exercise. At the more
formal level, modelling of default, (following on from the approach pioneered by
Martin Shubik and his co-authors), is the crucial element for the analysis of finan-
cial fragility that we have been developing, see Tsomocos (2003a and b), Good-
hart, Tsomocos and Sunirand (2004, 2005, 2006 a, 2006 b), Tsomocos and Zicchino
(2005).
At first glance, therefore, one might think that some metric of the number and
scale of defaults might, of itself, be a reasonable proxy as a metric of financial
fragility. Indeed, measures of the onset, and duration, of financial crises are often
based largely on major default events. Yet, for a variety of reasons we do not think
that a metric of ex post bank defaults, either for individual banks or for the banking
system as a whole, is quite suﬃcient; though surely the PD of a banking system is
a key component of its fragility/stability.
Perhaps the key reason for this is that PD is not just the result of accidental
events, exogenous shocks, but is in some large part determined endogenously by
the risk preferences and strategies of the agents involved. Agents can consciously
choose strategies which combine higher risks and higher expected profits. So if both
defaults and profits rise together, it is not a sign of increased fragility, rather an
indication of a shift in behavioural patterns. Similarly if the costs of bankruptcy
are reduced, e.g. by legislation, one would expect a rise in defaults and failures,
without that representing an indication of economic or financial weakness.
Another problem is more mundane, relating to the available data base. Major
bank failures are relatively rare events, in most countries, and quite often poten-
tial failures are nipped in the bud by various forms of quasi-nationalisation and
recapitalisation without their ever having been formally in default; Japan and the
treatment of Credit Lyonnais are examples. So bank-level data series for defaults is
diﬃcult to use in econometric analysis. For this reason, in our empirical analysis,
we use an indicator of the banking sector’s probability of default.
A profitable bank is, almost by definition, not in diﬃculties. So, bank prof-
itability could be a possible metric for financial fragility. But, as with PD, low
profitability can be a consequence of risk aversion, that is a low profit, low risk
strategy — quite common after a crisis — rather than a symptom of financial fragility
itself.
This leads us towards a two variable (factor) definition of financial fragility,
that is a combination of default probability and low profitability. This need for a
combination of factors has some marked disadvantages. In order to provide a single
metric of financial fragility, it is necessary to give some weighting to the two key
variables (PD and profitability, π), and that can only come from numerical exercises,
simulation and empirical estimation. Such exercises are inevitably illustrative rather
than conclusive.
Current and expected default probabilities, and profitability, are the main fun-
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damental determinants of bank equity values. In our simulations and empirical work
we examine how these factors influence bank equity valuations, and how bank equity
values feed back into real output. But again we cannot use bank equity values as
a single metric for financial fragility because so many other variables (factors) feed
back into the determination of such values. Indeed, these interactions are so com-
plex that we have not yet modelled such interactions in a rigorous, micro-founded,
general equilibrium format; we use a reduced form simplification in the simulations.
Again in our simulations we can show how the impact of various shocks works
through the system to aﬀect bank profits, PDs and bank equity, and ultimately
changes real output and real consumption. It is, of course, the latter than aﬀects
welfare. So, in our simulated system, we can define financial fragility as the relative
impact of a known and given shock on output, for various prior conditions of bank,
and client, capital strength, current profitability and risk preferences, for example.
For our empirical analysis we will use a reduced form VAR approach to evaluate the
impact of the two financial fragility "factors" (bank equity value, which we consider
a proxy of bank profitability, and bank default probabilities) on output.
The plan of the rest of this paper is as follows. In Section 2 we examine al-
ternative definitions of financial fragility. In Section 3 we provide a précis of our
basic analytical model. In Section 4 we run simulations of the eﬀect of a variety of
shocks in the banking system, focussing on their impact on output via changes in
PD, banks’ profits and banks’ equity values on output. Then in Section 5 we ex-
plore the eﬀects of shocks to bank equity values and bank probabilities of default on
output using a panel-VAR approach. Section 6 concludes and indicates directions
for future work.
2 Alternative definitions of financial fragility?
Numerous other authors have tackled financial stability and at one level the term
seems to be familiar both from a theoretical as well as a practical viewpoint. How-
ever, few attempts have been made to define and formally characterise it in an
analytically rigorous way. Academics and policy-makers have oﬀered various defini-
tions.1 For example, Andrew Crockett (1997) argues that ‘financial stability (refers)
to the stability of the key institutions and markets that go to make up the financial
system. . . stability requires (i) that the key institutions in the financial system are
stable, in that there is a high degree of confidence that they continue to meet their
contractual obligations without interruption or outside assistance; and (ii) that the
key markets are stable, in that participants can confidently transact in them at
prices that reflect fundamental forces and that do not vary substantially over short
periods when there have been no changes in fundamentals’. Mishkin (1994) oﬀers
a more ‘information-based’ definition. ‘Financial instability occurs when shocks to
the financial system interfere with information flows so that the financial system
can no longer do its job of channelling funds to those with productive investment
opportunities’.
1A survey of these definitions and extensive discussion can be found in Bank for International
Settlements (1998).
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Other authors have emphasised deviations from the optimal investment/savings
plan as a necessary ingredient of a definition of financial instability. For example,
Haldane et al (2004) propose the following definition: ‘...financial instability could
be defined as any deviation from the optimal saving-investment plan of the economy
that is due to imperfections in the financial sector.’ However, as Otmar Issing has
pointed out, ‘...the eﬃcient allocation of savings to investment, though without
doubt a highly desirable feature of an economy, should not be part of a definition
of financial stability. For example, no-one would say that savings were allocated
eﬃciently to investment opportunities in the Soviet Union between 1917 and 1991,
but the Soviet Union did not suﬀer from financial instability, except right at the
end of its existence.’2
Issing (2003) and Foot (2003) have suggested that financial stability is related to
financial market bubbles, or more generally, volatility in financial market proxies.
Indeed, bubbles impair financial markets eﬃciency, however, in and of themselves,
they do not constitute a defining characteristic of financial fragility, and more gener-
ally financial instability. One can classify Minsky’s Financial Instability Hypothesis
in this family of definitions3 since he claims that the inherent financial instability of
financial markets is based on the overoptimistic behaviour of economic agents. Fi-
nally, Anna Schwartz (1986) suggests that ‘a financial crisis is fuelled by fears that
means of payment will be unobtainable at any price and, in a fractional reserve
banking system, leads to a scramble for high powered money... In a futile attempt
to restore reserves, the banks may call in loans, refuse to roll over existing loans, or
resort to selling assets.’ Allen and Wood (2005) oﬀer a related definition.
The definition of financial fragility that we are proposing, for the reasons already
set out, is:4
A combination of probability of default (PD) - variously measured -
together with bank profitability. This has the added advantage that he
can be applied, mutatis mutandis, at both the individual and aggregate
levels.
Thus, financial instability is characterised by both high PDs and low profits.
Moreover, the authorities (government and/or the Central Bank) can influence the
level of debt above which (and the profit below which), a financial environment
becomes fragile. Also note that this definition can be related to the welfare of the
economy and its distributional consequences. This in turn conforms with deviations
from the optimal savings and investment plan in equilibrium, as has been suggested
by Haldane et al (2004). The standard techniques and theorems of equilibrium
theory can be readily applied. Equilibrium analysis is also amenable to comparative
statics, for example, by varying capital requirement rules one can aﬀect default
probabilities and the welfare eﬀects of a crisis.
This definition is suﬃciently flexible to encompass most of the recent episodes
of financial instability. The Mexican crisis of the early 1990s is a classic example of
such a crisis. The late 1990s east Asian crisis was characterised by a banking crisis
2From Issing (2003).
3 See Minsky (1985).
4 See Goodhart C.A.E., P, Sunirand, and D.P. Tsomocos (2004), and Tsomocos (2003 a,b) for
a formal definition.
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and economic recession as well as extensive default. Finally, the Russian crisis, the
Texas Banking crisis, and the U.S. Stock Market crash of 1987 conformed to the
characterisation of a financially unstable regime generated by extensive default and
declines in bank profitability.
In summary, the information-based definition of Mishkin, and of Issing and Foot,
and the institutionally oriented one oﬀered by Crockett and Schwarz encompass cru-
cial aspects of financial instability; however, they do not capture the main reason
that policy-makers focus on instability, namely its welfare and distributional eﬀects.
In other words, their definitions highlight the ineﬃciency that a financially unstable
regime generates but they are too general to be applicable for policy analysis. Wide-
spread default and a pronounced decrease in banks profitability eventually impair
markets and eventually trade collapses altogether. Thus, a systemic financial crisis
of the economy can be reinterpreted as a case of equilibrium non-existence.
We now provide a brief description of the model on which our analysis is based.5
3 Description of the model
The model incorporates heterogeneous banks and capital requirements in a general
equilibrium model with incomplete markets, money and default. It extends over
two periods and all uncertainty is resolved in the second period. Trade takes place
in both periods in the goods and equity markets. In the first period agents also
borrow from, or deposit money with banks, mainly to achieve a preferred time
path for consumption. Banks also trade amongst themselves, to smooth out their
individual portfolio positions. The Central Bank intervenes in the interbank market
to change the money supply and thereby set the interest rate. Capital adequacy
requirements (CARs) on banks are set by a regulator, who may, or may not, also
be the Central Bank. Penalties on violations of CARs, and on the default of any
borrower, are in force in both periods. In order to achieve formal completeness for
the model, banks are liquidated at the end of the second period and their profits
and assets distributed to shareholders. Figure 2 makes the time line of the model
explicit.
5For an extensive description of this variant of the model see Appendix I and Goodhart et al
(2005).
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1. Borrow and deposit in the interbank markets (B) 
2.  OMOs (CB) 
3. Borrow and deposit in the commercial bank loan 
and deposit markets (B and H) 
Nature decides which of the s∈S occurs  
1. Settlement of loans and deposits (H and B) 
2. Settlement of interbank loans and deposits (CB and B) 
3. Default and capital requirements’ violation settlement  
All banks are wound up. 
CB= Central Bank 
B   = Commercial Banks 
H   = Households 
t=1 
t=2 
Figure 1: The time structure of the model
In the first period trades by all agents take place against a background of uncer-
tainty about the economic conditions (the state of nature) that will prevail in the
second period. Agents are, however, assumed to have rational expectations, and to
know the likelihood (the probability distribution) of good or bad states occurring
when they make their choices in period one. In period two the actual economic
conjuncture (the state of nature) is revealed and all uncertainty is resolved.
The model incorporates a number of distinct, i.e. heterogeneous, commercial
banks, each characterised by a unique risk/return preference and diﬀerent initial
capital. Since each bank is, and is perceived as being, diﬀerent, it follows that
there is not a single market for either bank loans or bank deposits. In addition, we
introduce limited access to consumer credit markets, with each household assigned
(by history and custom) to borrow from a predetermined bank. This feature allows
for diﬀerent interest rates across the commercial banking sector. In sum, multiple
credit and deposit markets lead to diﬀerent loan rates among various banks and to
endogenous credit spreads between loan and deposit rates.
Individual non-bank agents are also assumed to diﬀer in their risk attitudes and
hence in their preferences for default. We model the incentive for avoiding default
by penalising agents and banks proportionately to the size of default. Banks that
violate their capital adequacy constraint are also penalised in proportion to the
shortfall of capital. Both banks and households are allowed to default on their
financial obligations, but not on commodity deliveries.
Our specification of the banking sector is based on a system comprising the seven
largest UK banks: Lloyds, HSBC, Abbey National, HBOS, Barclays, Royal Bank of
Scotland, and Standard Chartered; though the same modelling approach could, in
principle, be applied to the banking system of any other country, or region. Banks
γ and δ can represent any two of these individual banks, whereas bank τ represents
the aggregation of the remaining banks. In our calibration exercises, banks γ and
δ will be chosen specifically to represent two of these actual UK banks. However,
for data confidentiality reason, we will not reveal their identities.
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All banks in the model, b ∈ B = {γ, δ, τ}, are assumed to operate under a
perfectly competitive environment (i.e. they take all interest rates as exogenously
given when making their optimal portfolio decisions). The structure of their balance
sheets is given below;
Assets Liabilities
Loans to agents Deposits from Mr.φ
Interbank deposits Interbank borrowing
Market book Equity
Others
We assume that all banks endogenise their decisions in the loan, deposit and
interbank markets.6 The remaining variables are treated as exogenous.7 We further
assume that banks can default on their financial obligations, subject to default
penalties set by the regulator. Thus, by varying the penalties imposed on default
from 0 to infinity, we can model 100% default, no default or an equilibrium level of
default between 0 and 100%.8 At first sight, this ‘continuous’ default rate approach
may seem problematic since in reality banks either repay in full at the due date or
are forced to close down. However, we interpret a bank’s default rate in our model
as a probability that such bank chooses to shut down, and hence in the short run
to default completely on its financial obligations. Therefore, a bank’s decision to
increase its default rates is isomorphic to its decision to adopt a riskier position
in pursuit of higher expected profitability.9 With a large number of agents, as in
a competitive equilibrium, conditions where everyone defaults on, say, 5% of their
liabilities are equivalent to those where 5% of agents default on all their debts. This,
however, is not the case when there are only a few agents in a concentrated field.
If there are, say, only two agents in the field, and their failures are independent of
each other, then in 0.25% of all cases there will be 100% default, in 9.75% of cases
50% default, and in 90% of cases no default, which is clearly vastly diﬀerent from a
5% default rate amongst a large number of agents.
In most countries banking is a concentrated service industry. Moreover, repu-
tational eﬀects and cross-default clauses, amongst other things, mean that banks
cannot default partially and remain open. If they cannot meet their payment oblig-
ations, (except under force majeure as in 9/11), they have to close their doors.
Except when such closed banks are tiny, such closure does not however, in almost
all cases, then turn into permanent liquidation. Eﬀectively almost all banks are
restructured, often via a ‘bridge bank’ arrangement, and shortly re-open, with the
extent of short-fall of assets distributed amongst the various creditors, (the ‘haircut’
in the American phrase), the shareholders and taxpayers depending on the deposit
6The modelling of the banking sector follows Shubik and Tsomocos (1992) and Tsomocos (2003a
and b).
7As explained in Goodhart et al. (2005), we cannot endogenise banks’ decisions on market
book or equity. Since the model has two states in the second period and one unconstrained asset,
the interbank market investment, adding another unconstrained asset would make the markets
complete.
8This modelling of default follows Shubik and Wilson (1977).
9For more on this issue, see work in progress by Tsomocos and Zicchino (2004).
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insurance arrangements, bank bankruptcy laws and political pressures. In this lat-
ter sense, even though the banking system is concentrated, and banks have to close
when they cannot meet due payments, it is perfectly valid to assess strategies as
bringing about possible conditions in which a bank defaults by, say, 5% to all de-
positors, because that would be the eﬀective loss of funds, or haircut, in the event
of a bad state of the world.
Finally, as in Bhattacharya et al. (2003), we make a simplifying assumption
by assuming that banks’ default rates in the deposit and interbank markets are
the same, i.e. that banks are restricted to repay all their creditors in the same
proportion.
Banks can also violate their capital adequacy requirement, subject to capital
requirement violation penalties set by the regulator. In principle, each bank’s ef-
fective capital to asset ratios may not be binding, (i.e. their values may be above
the regulator’s requirement), in which case they are not subject to any capital re-
quirement penalty. However, in our calibration exercises, we assume for simplicity
that each bank wants to keep a buﬀer above the required minimum, so that there
is a non-pecuniary loss of reputation as capital declines; in this sense the ratios are
always binding. Put diﬀerently, we assume that banks’ self-imposed ideal capital
holdings are always above the actual values of all banks’ capital to asset ratios.
Given this assumption, we can rule out corner equilibria and therefore focus our
analysis entirely on well-defined interior solutions whereby banks violate their en-
hanced capital requirements. We assume that penalties are linear as capital declines
from its ideal level.10
The calibration exercises presented in sections 4 are based on the data of UK
banks at the end of 2002. At that point in time, bank δ is a net lender whereas banks
γ and τ are net borrowers in the interbank market.11 The optimisation problem of
banks, as well as the rest of the model, is described in more detail in Appendix I.12
4 Comparative statics analysis
We now turn to a description of the outcome of the exercise where we sought to cal-
ibrate the model against UK data. As noted earlier, the model has two periods, and
in our simulation exercises, two possible states in the second period, with state 1 be-
ing the ‘good’ state, and 2 the ‘bad’ state. There are four households, denoted with
α, β, θ and φ, three banks, δ, γ and τ and a central bank/regulator. Given the lim-
ited participation condition in the loan market, households α, β, and θ borrow from
banks γ, δ, and τ , respectively. Household φ represents a pool of depositors who are
able to deposit with any of the banks. We do not in fact know the identities, nor do
10 In practice, there will be some non-linearity as capital falls below its required minimum, but
this is just too complex to model at this stage.
11As noted earlier, we have chosen banks γ and δ to represent specifically two of the seven largest
UK banks in our calibration exercise. Bank τ then represents the aggregation of the remaining
five banks.
12The interested reader can also refer to Goodhart et al (2005). The model used here has
a slightly diﬀerent specification of the reduced-form equations describing the behaviour of the
household sector.
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we have data available for, these sets of borrowers who borrow from each individual
bank, i.e. there is a lack of data for households disaggregated by their connection
to particular banks. Owing to this lack of such data, we model the behaviour of
the various households via reduced-form equations.13 Finally, the Central Bank
uses its ability to vary the monetary base as its monetary policy instrument and
fixes the supply of bank reserves by injecting, or withdrawing, funds in the inter-
bank market. There is, of course, a dual relationship between the policy-determined
short-term interest rate and the quantity of bank reserves, though this relationship
can be aﬀected by the institutional details of the precise way in which the Central
Bank operates in the money markets. In practice, Central Banks always set interest
rates rather than the reserve base (see Bindseil, 2004). One reason that they do
so is that setting interest rates (rather than reserve quantities) strongly dampens
the eﬀects of certain shocks on the banking system. But by the same token, taking
the reserve base as fixed in our simulations provides clearer and stronger responses
to shocks, which is useful for illustrative purposes. Meanwhile, the regulator sets
the capital adequacy requirements, and also the penalties for infringing these. At
the same time, the penalties for default are quite largely non-pecuniary, depending
on reputational loss, the severity of the bankruptcy laws in limiting future options,
etc. Again, we do not attempt to model these, at any rate at this stage, with any
great accuracy, and therefore we treat them as predetermined.
As it will become clear from the following comparative statics exercises, when-
ever a shock to the economy induces financial fragility, GDP (which we take as a
proxy of welfare) decreases.14
4.1 A contractionary monetary policy shock
We report the results of simulated shocks to the economy under the assumption that
banks are constrained by a capital requirement. We then repeat the simulations
under the assumption that CARs are not in place. In the next two sections we report
and explain the reaction of key variables to a tightening of monetary policy (under
the assumption that the Central Bank uses its base money as its monetary policy
instrument). The results of additional comparative statics exercises are presented
in Appendix II.15
4.1.1 Case I: banks are subject to a capital adequacy requirement
The percentage changes in the values of the variables in response to a 10 percent
drop in the Bank’s base money (from 69.28 to 62.30 trillion pounds) are shown in
Table 1.
13See equations (12)-(15) in Appendix I.
14 In the more general set-up of the model, where household choices are derived from agents
maximising their utility functions, financial fragility is always associated to a decrease in the sum
of agents’ utility.
15 See also Goodhart and Zicchino (2005) for a description of analogous simulation exercises.
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Bank 2.8 3 0.06 0.1 0.005 0.003 0.35 0.38 -0.02 -0.04
Bank 2.4 3.3 0.12 0.3 0.03 0.08 0.5 0.6 0.005 -0.04
Bank 2.4 3.3 0.02 0.03 0.005 0.005 0.47 0.5 0.003 -0.01
2.4 -0.18 -0.17
Interest rates
Table 1: % change in key variables given a negative 10% shock to M  at t=1
b
dr br ρ
b
iπ biiπ bie biie bik biυ biiυ iGDP iiGDPbiik
δ
γ
τ
Legend:
rb = lending rate oﬀered by bank b ∈ B = {δ, γ, τ},
rbd = deposit rate oﬀered by bank b,
ρ = interbank rate,
πbs = profits of bank b in state of the world s = {i, ii} ,
ebs = capital held by bank b in state s,
kbs = ratio of capital to risk-weighted assets of bank b in state s,
vbs = repayment rate of bank b to all its creditors in state s,
GDPs = GDP in state s.
As can be seen from the table, the interbank rate increases by 2.4 percent (from
4.41% to 4.52%). Given a higher rate of return on interbank loans, other things
equal, bank δ invests more in this market. To do so, it seeks more funds from
the deposit markets and it cuts on lending to its customer, β (banks’ loans are not
shown in Table 1).16 This portfolio adjustment causes a 2.8% increase in δ’s deposit
rate and a 3% increase in its lending rate (from 3.88% to 3.99% and from 7.45%
to 7.68%, respectively). Banks γ and τ , who are net borrowers in the interbank
market, respond to a higher ρ by reducing their interbank borrowing, by increasing
their demand for deposits, and by reducing loan supply to their customers, α and
θ. This, in turn, causes the deposit and lending rates of these to banks to increase.
All banks anticipate that a lower credit availability will cause a higher rate of
households’ default as the decrease in liquidity aﬀects next-period income negatively
(GDP decreases in both states of the world). Households’ repayment rates decrease
by approximately 0.1% in the good state of the world and by 0.14 percent in the bad
state (not shown in Table 1). Thus, the expected rate of return on loans decreases
for all banks and their willingness to supply credit decreases even further. The
lower rate of return on household loans and the higher cost of funds have a negative
eﬀect on the profits of banks γ and τ while bank δ benefits from the higher return
on interbank market investments. However, since banks are subject to a capital
requirement and therefore need to increase their profits to accumulate capital, they
choose to increase their default rates (the default rates increase when the repayment
rates vbs decrease). Put in another way, banks adopt riskier strategies to counteract
the negative eﬀect on profits of the liquidity contraction.
16The complete comparative statics results are available on request.
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4.1.2 Case II: banks are not subject to capital requirements
We perform the same comparative statics exercises under the assumption that banks
do not have to comply with a capital adequacy requirement. We present here the
results of a contractionary monetary policy and report the rest of the simulations
in Appendix II. This additional set of simulations allows us to better assess the role
of capital adequacy regulation in the transmission of shocks to the banking system
and to the economy.
We assume a tightening of monetary policy under the assumption that the Cen-
tral Bank uses changes in base money as its monetary policy instrument.
The percentage changes in the values of the variables in response to a 10% drop
in the Bank’s base money (from 69.28 to 62.30 trillion pounds) are shown in Table
2.
Bank 3.1 3.3 0 0.003 0 0 0.35 0.38 -0.02 -0.04
Bank 2.7 3.7 0.005 0.004 0.001 0.002 0.5 0.6 0.007 -0.008
Bank 2.7 3.6 -0 -0 -0 -0 0.5 0.5 0.004 -0.01
Table 2: % change in key variables given a negative 10% shock to M  at t=1 (no CARs)
Interest rates
2.7 -0.18 -0.18
b
dr br ρ
b
iπ biiπ bie biie bik biυ biiυ iGDP iiGDPbiik
δ
γ
τ
Qualitatively the results are very similar to the ones obtained in the previous
exercises. A key diﬀerence however is that the change in bank profitability is now
smaller (and for one bank it is slightly negative). This is due to the fact that banks
have now a lower incentive to raise capital, and therefore profits. Furthermore, the
lower value of bank equity (not shown in the table) has the eﬀect that GDP falls
slightly more with respect to the analogous simulation with CARs.
4.2 Do capital requirements aﬀect financial fragility?
For a variety of reasons the Modigliani-Miller theorem, whereby the liability struc-
ture of a firm is immaterial to its overall valuation, is inapplicable to banks. These
reasons include incomplete markets, dead-weight bankruptcy costs, the existence of
tax shelters, etc. There is, therefore, an internal equilibrium wherein a bank will
choose a preferred distribution of equity (type) capital and (fixed interest) deposit
liabilities.
Owing to the risk of contagion, whereby, through a variety of routes, e.g. defaults
on interbank liabilities, forced asset sales depressing asset values, etc., failure in one
bank can generate failures in other banks, more capital in bank i can also help to
protect depositors in bank j (allowing bank i to survive larger shocks). But this
(social) benefit will not be internalised. Hence the argument that social benefits
11
will be enhanced by requiring banks to hold more capital than they would otherwise
have done.
The stylised fact is that, at the bank’s individually chosen equilibrium, the mean
expected return to equity is greater than the interest rate payable on deposits. Hence
an eﬀective CAR, i.e. one that actually does raise capital ratios, will mean that, if
the prior equilibrium asset portfolio was maintained, profits will now fall below their
desired level. So a bank will now choose higher profitability, ceteris paribus, but
can only do this by taking on more risk (in an eﬃcient market) and/or by raising
interest rate spreads. In turn, such higher interest rates, charged to borrowers, will
cause them to borrow less, which (in our model) reduces GDP and to take on riskier
projects (i.e. to plan to default more often).
So, the benefits to financial stability of safer banks (o.a. higher capital and higher
overall profits) will be oﬀset, to some extent, by both banks and bank borrowers
selecting riskier portfolios (choosing to accept higher probabilities of default), higher
interest rates and lower output. This is, indeed, the pattern that appears in our
simulations. In all cases, except one, profitability is higher following an adverse
shock when an eﬀective CAR is in place. The exception is in the bad state after
an increase in default penalties. This is intuitive since CARs cause banks to choose
higher default probabilities, so an increase in such penalties will induce them to
reverse their tracks, at least partially.
In our simulations, and model, the imposition of CARs leads banks to raise
interest rate spreads (marginally), and hence lead to slightly lower bank borrowing,
and hence GDP. Again the simulations show a slightly greater decline in GDP, when
an adverse shock occurs, when CARs are in place, with, as before, an exception when
the shock is an increase in default penalties.
What this tells us is that CARs will influence bank/borrowers’ behaviour to-
wards the adoption of greater risk and charging higher rates. This is well known in
the academic literature (Hellman et al. (2000), Repullo (2004), Repullo and Suarez
(2004)). Even if this oﬀset to CARs were unchecked, their introduction might still
be a net benefit, depending on the likelihood of bank contagion, the expected form
and probability of future shocks, etc.
In practice this adverse side-eﬀect can be mitigated by relating CARs more
closely (than we have modelled here) to the relative riskiness of assets (as done in
Basel II), by raising default penalties (to counter the incentive to choose riskier
strategies), or by limiting the allowable rise in interest rates (as suggested by Hell-
man et al ; this latter has various unfortunate side eﬀects).
Could one use this kind of model to try to estimate those values of CAR and
default penalties that would maximise social welfare? In principle the answer is
yes, but in practice the range on inherent uncertainties (e.g. on future shocks),
the necessity for heroic assumptions and simplifications, etc., would make any such
attempt an illustrative exercise rather than a practical tool kit, at least for the time
being.
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5 Empirical Analysis
In the following sections we analyse the relationship between a small number of
macroeconomic variables and both the probability of default and equity index of
the banking sector of seven industrialised countries. The upshot of our econometric
analysis is to examine the impact of bank default and profitability on GDP in order
to asses the definition of financial stabilty discussed in section 2.
5.1 Data, variables and stylised facts
Data were collected for countries, some of which had experienced episodes of finan-
cial stress, and for which a measure of the probability of default of the banking
sector was available. These countries are: Finland, Norway, Sweden, Korea, UK,
Germany, and Japan. The sample period is from the fourth quarter of 1990 to the
fourth quarter of 2004.
The tests sought to examine whether financial fragility, defined as either, or
both of, an increase in PD rates and a reduction in profitability, would have an
impact upon economic welfare. The macroeconomic variables were obtained from
the IMF’s International Financial Statistics and the OECD. Inflation is defined as
growth rate in the CPI index and the interest rate is the IFS call money rate.
Residential property prices were obtained from the BIS. For each country, an index
of banking sector equity, obtained from Bloomberg, was used to proxy banking
sector profitability. The measure of the probability of default of the countries’
banking sectors is a transformation of the distance to default indicator (DD) used
by the IMF to gauge banking sector soundness.17
On the basis of simple statistics, as expected a priori, for most of the coun-
tries in the sample there appears to be a negative correlation between defaults and
profitability.
5.2 Econometric model and regression results
We use a panel data Vector Autoregression (panel VAR) methodology for our empir-
ical investigation.18 This technique combines the traditional VAR approach, which
treats all the variables in the system as endogenous, with the panel data approach,
which allows for unobserved heterogeneity. We specify our model of order s as
follows:
zi,t = Γ0 + Γ1zi,t−1 + Γ2zi,t−2 + ...+ Γszi,t−s + fi + et. (1)
In our main model zi,t represents a four-variable vector {pod, gdp, eq, inf } , where
pod, a transformation of the distance to default, is our measure of the banking
sector’s default risk, gdp is the growth rate of GDP, eq is the annual growth rate of
the bank equity index ,and inf is the inflation rate. In all models, the variable pod
is further transformed so that it has a value greater than zero only in those quarters
in which it is above a given threshold, otherwise it is set equal to zero. Earlier
17See Goodhart, Hofmann and Segoviano (2005) for more details on how the measure is con-
structed.
18The analysis has been conducting using the programme developed by Love (2001).
13
testing had shown that pod had a non-linear relationship with GDP. Below a certain
threshold, whose value was estimated by empirical examination, fluctuations in pod
had no eﬀect on GDP. Similarly, fluctuations in bank equity values also appear to
have a threshold eﬀect on GDP, with the threshold also empirically estimated. It
is only when bank equity declines, fairly sharply, that GDP is adversely aﬀected.
We focus on the impulse-response functions, which describe the reaction of one
variable to the innovations in another variable in the system, while holding all other
shocks equal to zero. However, since the actual variance-covariance matrix of the
errors is unlikely to be diagonal, to isolate shocks to one of the variables in the
system, it is necessary to decompose the residuals in such a way that they become
orthogonal. We do this by applying a Choleski decomposition of the variance-
covariance matrix of the residuals (this is equivalent to transforming the system in
a recursive VAR). The identifying assumption is that the variables that come earlier
in the ordering aﬀect the following variables contemporaneously, as well as with lags,
while the variables that come later aﬀect the previous variables only with lags. In
our specifications we assume that the probability of default aﬀects all other variables
in the system contemporaneously and with lags, while macroeconomic variables such
as GDP and inflation aﬀect the default risk of the banking sector only with a lag.
We experimented with diﬀerent ordering of the variables (and therefore diﬀerent
identification assumptions) and obtained results that were qualitatively similar to
the ones presented here. In applying the VAR procedure to panel data, we need
to impose the restriction that the underlying structure is the same for each cross-
sectional unit. Since the constraint is likely to be violated in practice, one way to
overcome the restriction on the parameters is to allow for individual heterogeneity
in the levels of the variables by introducing fixed eﬀects, denoted by fi in equation
(1). Since the fixed eﬀects are correlated with the regressors due to lags of the
dependent variables, the mean-diﬀerencing procedure commonly used to eliminate
fixed eﬀects would create biased coeﬃcients. To avoid this problem we use forward
mean-diﬀerencing, also referred to as the ‘Helmert procedure’ (See Arellano and
Bond, 1995). This procedure removes only the forward mean, i.e. the mean of
all the future observations available for each country-quarter. This transformation
preserves the orthogonality between transformed variables and lagged regressors, so
we can use lagged regressors as instruments and estimate the coeﬃcients by system
GMM.
In the simulations based on the calibrated model we show that whenever banks’
default rates increase and banks’ profitability decrease (above the threshold), i.e.
when the economy is more financially fragile, GDP (our proxy of welfare) falls.19
For this reason we claim that the two ‘banking sector’ variables are a measure of
the financial instability of an economy. Our aim here is to investigate whether data
give any support to our model, namely that our two measures of banking sector’s
distress do have the predicted impact on output. We thus proceed by analysing
19 In the general version of the model, an increase in default and a decrease in profitability
is always associated with a reduction in agents’ welfare (see Goodhart, Sunirand and Tsomocos
(2004).
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the impulse response functions of the VAR model. Estimate of these and their
confidence intervals are shown in Figures 2-4 in Appendix III.20
Figure 2reports the impulse-responses for a 3 lag VAR including pod, gdp, eq,
and inf. The second row in the figure shows the response of gdp to a one standard
deviation shock to the other variables of the model. The response of GDP growth
to pod is negative and significant (i.e. an increase of the default probability of the
banking sector induces a decrease in the growth rate of GDP). Also, the response of
GDP growth to a shock to the banking sector equity index is positive and significant.
Put in a diﬀerent way, maintaining all other variables constant, a positive shock to
the banks’ probability of default has a negative impact on output while a positive
shock to the banks’ equity value has a positive impact on output. These results are
in line with the predictions of our model. The rest of the impulse response estimates
are quite standard and intuitive: the bank equity index responds negatively to a
positive shock to the bank probability of default while the impact of GDP growth on
the same index is positive but marginally significant. Finally, a positive innovation
in output growth induces a negative and significant decrease in inflation. This
would be consistent with a positive supply shock. However, we do not estimate a
structural model, so we are not able to identify supply and demand factors.
In order to check the robustness of the results, we run additional regressions
adding a few variables that are usually included in small macroeconomic models
for the analysis of monetary transmission and monetary policy (see for example
Goodhart and Hofmann, 2005). Figure 3 reports the impulse-responses of a 3 lag
VAR where a property price index, propprice, is added to the variables of the
previous specification. The first row shows the responses of pod : its response to
a positive shock to property prices is negative and significant. This is likely due
to the fact that a higher property price index translates in a higher bank asset
values, which in turn decreases banks’ probability of default. As the second row
in Figure 3 shows, the impact of a shock to pod of gdp is less significant that in
the previous specification but it still goes in the right direction.. Moreover, gdp
responds positively to a shock to the property price index. The response of the
bank equity index to a shock to bank default risk is less marked than before but
still negative while the response to a positive output shock is more significant and
more persistent.
Finally, we analyse a model that includes the short term interest rate, ir. Figure
4 shows the impulse-responses. Their behaviour is very similar to the previous
model. The impact of the added variable, the short term interest rate, is quite
intuitive. A positive shock to ir induces a positive response of the banking sector’s
probability of default, a negative response of GDP growth, a negative response of
20We calculate standard errors of the impulse-response functions and generate confidence inter-
vals with Monte Carlo simulations. In practice, we randomly generate a draw of the coeﬃcients
Γ in model (1) using the estimated coeﬃcients and their variance-covariance matrix and recalcu-
late the impulse-responses. We repeat this procedure 1000 times (we experimented with a larger
number of repetitions and obtained similar results). We generate the 5th and 95th percentiles of
this distribution, which we use as a confidence interval for the impulse-responses.
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property prices. The response of inflation is however positive. This result is common
to most of the VAR estimations of small macroeconomic models and can often be
removed by adding another variable measuring import or commodity prices.
5.3 Variance decomposition
The variance decomposition of the models confirm the main results. Although,
as expected, the variation in GDP growth 10 and 20 quarters ahead is mainly
explained by GDP growth itself, bank probability of default and equity index explain
a significant part of its change in the basic model specification (see Table 9).
Quarters
ahead
10 97.32 0.87 1.45 0.35
20 97.18 0.96 1.48 0.36
10 11.12 86.38 2.09 0.38
20 11.28 86.13 0.27 0.4
10 41.19 6.09 50.77 1.63
20 41.27 6.39 50.63 1.69
10 16.19 10.71 10.11 62.97
20 16.42 10.87 11.02 61.68
pod
inf
gdp
equity
Table 9. Variance decompositions: percent of variation in the row variable 
explained by the column variable
Model (1) pod gdp equity inf
When we include a property price index in the regression, this variable explains
variation in gdp more than bank equity values, as shown in Table 10.
Table 10: Variance-decompositions: percent of variation in the row variable explained by 
column variable 
Model (2) Quarters ahead pod gdp equity inf propprice 
10 63.40 8.59 1.35 3.30 23.35 pod 20 62.96 8.57 1.42 3.85 23.19 
10 7.36 85.44 0.48 1.78 4.92 gdp  20 7.56 84.12 0.57 2.35 5.38 
10 16.16 16.00 58.94 5.17 3.70 equity 
20 16.12 15.79 58.67 5.30 4.10 
10 6.60 3.90 1.20 87.96 0.32 inf 
20 6.81 4.31 1.48 86.67 0.71 
10 10.96 10.73 15.99 20.46 41.84 propprice 20 12.04 10.77 19.41 21.12 36.63 
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Finally, adding the short term interest rate to variable does not seem to alter
the result of the previous specification: the bank equity index does not have much
explanatory power of the variation in gdp (see Table 11).
Table 11: Variance-decompositions: percent of variation in the row variable explained by column 
variable 
Model (3) Quarters ahead pod gdp equity inf ir propprice 
10 57.57 10.81 1.68 1.37 5.08 23.46 pod 20 57.11 10.80 1.72 1.88 5.14 23.32 
10 6.25 83.67 0.55 2.45 2.83 4.22 gdp  20 6.35 82.33 0.60 3.13 3.15 4.41 
10 10.43 21.89 58.83 2.57 5.67 0.58 equity 
20 10.27 21.58 58.31 2.67 6.56 0.59 
10 5.53 2.54 1.35 83.57 6.15 0.84 inf 
20 5.50 3.41 1.46 82.32 6.40 0.87 
10 2.91 1.79 7.02 10.62 77.18 0.45 ir 20 2.70 2.17 7.89 12.59 74.17 0.45 
10 1.61 30.13 12.22 12.34 28.28 15.38 propprice 20 1.09 28.40 14.04 12.98 35.36 8.09 
 
5.4 Country-level analysis
To test the robustness of the panel results, we conducted a country level analysis,
using again a VAR approach. The model specification includes four variables (pod,
gdp, eq, inf ). We include, in addition to the contemporary values of the variables,
the first and fourth lag. We use a Choleski decomposition to identify the shocks and
obtain estimates of the impulse-response functions. All the graphs are presented in
Appendix III. The country-level results are in line with the evidence provided by the
panel data analysis. As it is the case for the panel VAR, GDP responds negatively
and significantly to a positive shock to the banking sector’s probability of default
for Korea, Sweden and Finland. The response is negative but not significant for the
UK and Germany. This is not surprising since there were hardly any observations
of pod in these two countries above the threshold level. In contrast to the panel
VAR, the response of GDP is positive (but not very significant) for Norway and
positive (but not significant) for Japan. The response of GDP to bank equity index
is positive for Norway, Japan, Sweden and the UK (but not very significant for the
last two countries) while it is not significant for Korea, Finland and Germany. On
balance, the country-level analysis gives us some confidence in the robustness of the
panel VAR results.
17
6 Concluding remarks
In this paper we propose a definition of financial fragility as a combination of high
probability of default (PD) and low bank profitability. This definition is model-
based in the sense that in an economy with maximising agents and banks as de-
scribed in Goodhart et al (2004, 2005 and 2006 a) when, following a shock to
an exogenous variable, aggregate endogenous default increases and banks’ profits
decrease, agents’ welfare falls. We therefore think of an economy as being more
financially fragile (or equivalently less financially stable) if agents’ welfare decreases
following an exogenous shock that induces distress in the financial system. We run
comparative statics exercises based on a simplified version of the model. Specifically,
we introduce a set of reduced-form equations describing households’ behaviour to
be able to calibrate the model against UK data. In this version, we use output as
a proxy for agents’ welfare. We simulate a series of shocks to the economy under
two alternative assumptions: that banks are constrained by capital adequacy re-
quirements and that they are not. When banks do not have to comply with CARs,
shocks that induce a decline in banks profits and an increase in banks’ default rates
also produce a fall in GDP. Under the assumption of capital adequacy constraints,
most shocks do not result in a fall in bank profits. The reason for this is that banks
need to maintain or top up their capital, and they do this by choosing (riskier) in-
vestments that raise their profits. Finally, we investigate whether data support our
claim that banking sector’s distress induces welfare losses (i.e. a drop in GDP). The
results of our panel VAR model, which includes banking sector and macroeconomic
data of seven industrialised countries, are in line with those of the simulations.
Shocks to banks’ probability of default and equity values have a impact on output
that is significant and has the expected sign.
7 Appendix I: The model by Goodhart, Sunirand
and Tsomocos (2005)
The model has three heterogeneous banks, b ∈ B = {γ, δ, τ}, four private sector
agents, h ∈ H = {α, β, θ, φ}, a Central Bank and a regulator. The time horizon
extends over two periods, t ∈ T = {1, 2} and two possible states in the second
period, s ∈ S = {i, ii}. State i is a normal/good state and occurs with probability
p while state ii represents an extreme/crisis event.
Individual bank borrowers are assigned during the two periods, by history or by
informational constraint, to borrow from a single bank: agents α, β, and θ borrow
from banks γ, δ, and τ , respectively. The remaining agent, φ, represents the pool of
depositors in this economy who supply funds to every bank. This limited participa-
tion assumption implies multiple active markets for deposits (by separate bank) and
for loans (by borrower and bank). In addition, we assume a single, undiﬀerentiated,
interbank market where deficit banks borrow from surplus banks, and wherein the
Central Bank conducts open market operations (OMOs).
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At t = 1, loan, deposit and interbank markets open. Banks decide how much to
lend/borrow in each market, expecting any one of the two possible future scenarios
to occur. The Central Bank conducts OMOs in the interbank market. At t = 2 all
financial contracts are settled, subject to any defaults and/or capital requirements’
violations, which are then penalised. At the end of the second period all banks are
wound up.
7.0.1 The interbank net borrowers’ (banks γ and τ) optimisation prob-
lems
Bank b ∈ {γ, τ} maximises its payoﬀ, which is a quadratic function of expected
profits in the second period minus non-pecuniary penalties that it has to incur if it
defaults on its deposit and interbank obligations. It also suﬀers a capital violation
penalty proportional to its capital requirement violation. Formally, the optimisation
problem of bank b ∈ {γ, τ} is as follows:
max
mb,µb,µbd,v
b
s,s∈S
Πb =
X
s∈S
ps[πbs−cbs
¡
πbs
¢2
]−
X
s∈S
ps
"
λbksmax[0, k
b − kbs]+
λbs[ µ
b − vbsµb] + λbs[ µbd − vbsµbd]
#
subject to
mb +Ab =
µb
(1 + ρ)
+
µbd
(1 + rbd)
+ eb0 +Others
b (2)
vbsµ
b + vbsµ
b
d +Others
b + eb0 ≤ vh
b
sb (1 + r
b)mb + (1 + rA)Ab, s ∈ S (3)
where,
πbs = ∆(3) (4)
ebs = e
b
0 + π
b
s, s ∈ S (5)
kbs =
ebs
ωvhbsb (1 + r
b)mb + eω(1 + rA)Ab , s ∈ S (6)
∆(x) ≡ the diﬀerence between RHS and LHS of inequality (x)
ps ≡ probability that state s ∈ S will occur,
cbs ≡ coeﬃcient of risk aversion in the utility function of bank b ∈ B,
λbks ≡ capital requirements’ violation penalties imposed on bank b ∈ B in state
s ∈ S ,
k
b ≡ capital adequacy requirement for bank b ∈ B,
λbs ≡ default penalties on bank b ∈ B,
µb ≡ amount of money that bank b ∈ {γ, τ} owes in the interbank market,
µbd ≡ amount of money that bank b ∈ B owes in the deposit market,
vbs ≡ repayment rates of bank b ∈ B to all its creditors in state s ∈ S,
mb ≡ amount of credit that bank b ∈ B extends in the loan market,
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Ab ≡ the value of market book held by bank b ∈ B,
ebs ≡ amount of capital that bank b ∈ B holds in state s ∈ {0} ∪ S,
Othersb ≡ the ‘others’ item in the balance sheet of bank b ∈ B,
rb ≡ lending rate oﬀered by bank b ∈ B,
rbd ≡ deposit rate oﬀered by bank b ∈ B,
ρ ≡ interbank rate,
rA ≡ the rate of return on market book,
vh
b
sb ≡ repayment rates of agent hb ∈ Hb = {αγ , βδ, θτ} to his nature-selected
bank b ∈ B in the consumer loan market,
ω ≡ risk weight on consumer loans, andeω ≡ risk weight on market book.
Equation (2) implies that, at t = 1, the assets of bank b ∈ {γ, τ}, which consist
of its credit extension and market book investment, must be equal to its liabilities
obtained from interbank and deposit borrowing and its initial equity endowment,
where ‘Othersb’ represents the residual. Equations (3) and (4) then show that,
dependent on which of the s ∈ S actually occurs, the profit that bank b incurs
in the second period is equal to the diﬀerence between the amount of money that
it receives from its asset investment and the amount that it has to repay on its
liabilities, adjusted appropriately for default in each market. As shown in equation
(5), the profit earned is then added to its initial capital, which in turn becomes
its capital in the second period. Finally, equation (6) implies that the capital to
asset ratio of bank b in state s ∈ S is equal to its capital in state s divided by its
risk-weighted assets in the corresponding state.
7.0.2 The interbank net lender’s (bank δ) optimisation problem
Bank δ, unlike the other two banks, is a net lender in the interbank market. Thus it
suﬀers only a default penalty in the deposit market. Formally, bank δ’s optimisation
problem is as follows:
max
mδ,dδ,µδd,v
δ
s ,s∈S
Πδ =
X
s∈S
ps[π
δ
s−cδs
¡
πδs
¢2
]−
X
s∈S
ps
h
λδksmax[0, k
δ − kδs ] + λδs[µδd − vδsµδd]
i
subject to
Aδ + dδ +mδ = eδ0 +
µδd
(1 + rδd)
+Othersδ (7)
vδsµ
δ
d +Others
δ + eδ0 ≤ v
βδ
sδm
δ(1 + rδ) +Aδ(1 + rA) + eRsdδ(1 + ρ) (8)
where,
πδs = ∆(8) (9)
eδs = e
δ
0 + π
δ
s (10)
kδs =
eδs
ωvβ
δ
sδ (1 + r
δ)mδ + ω eRsdδ(1 + ρ) + eω(1 + rA)Aδ (11)
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dδ ≡ bank δ’s investment in the interbank market,eRs ≡ the rate of repayment that bank δ expects to get from its interbank
investment, and
ω ≡ risk weight on interbank investment.
The budget set of bank δ is similar to those of the other two banks except that
it invests in, instead of borrows from, the interbank market. Moreover, its risk-
weighted assets in the second period, as shown in equation (11), also includes bank
δ’s expected return on its interbank investment.
7.1 Central Bank and Regulator
The Central Bank conducts monetary policy by engaging in open market operations
in the interbank market. It can either set its base money (M) as its monetary policy
instrument, allowing the interbank rate to be determined endogenously, or it can fix
the interbank rate and let its base money adjust endogenously to clear the interbank
market.
The regulator sets capital adequacy requirements for all banks (k
b
) and imposes
penalties on their failure to meet such requirements (λbks) and on default on their
financial obligations in the deposit and interbank markets (λbs). Finally, the regula-
tor sets the risk weights on consumer loan, interbank and market book investment
(ω, ω, eω).
7.2 Household sector
Each household borrower, hb = {αγ , βδ, θτ}, demands consumer loans from his
nature-selected bank and chooses whether to default on his loans in state s ∈ S.
The remaining agent, φ, supplies his deposits to each bank b. As mentioned, we
do not explicitly model the optimisation problems of households but assume the
following reduced-form equations.
7.2.1 Household borrowers’ demand for Loans
Because of the limited participation assumption in every consumer loan market, each
household’s demand for loans is a negative function of the lending rate oﬀered by
his nature-selected bank. In addition, his demand for loans also depends positively
on the expected GDP in the subsequent period. So we implicitly assume that
household borrowers rationally anticipate GDP in both states of the next period,
which then determines their expected future income, and adjust their loan demand
in the initial period accordingly in order to smooth their consumption over time.
The money demand function manifests the standard Hicksian elements whereby
it responds positively to current and expected income and negatively to interest
rates. In particular, household hb’s loan demand from his nature-selected bank b,
∀hb ∈ Hb, and b ∈ B is as follows:
ln(µh
b
) = ahb,1 + ahb,2 ln[p(GDPi) + (1− p)GDPii] + ahb,3rb (12)
where,
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µh
b ≡ amount of money that agent hb ∈ Hb chooses to owe in the loan market
of bank b ∈ B, and
GDPs ≡ Gross Domestic Product in state s ∈ S of the second period.
7.2.2 Deposit Supply
Unlike the loan markets, we do not assume limited participation in the deposit
markets. This implies that φ can choose to diversify his deposits with every bank.
Thus, Mr. φ’s deposit supply with bank b depends not only on the deposit rate
oﬀered by b but also on the rates oﬀered by the other banks. Moreover, since banks
can default on their deposit obligations, the expected rate of return on deposit
investment of φ with each bank has to be adjusted appropriately for each bank’s
corresponding expected default rate. Finally, φ’s deposit supply is a positive function
of the expected GDP. In symbols, φ’s deposit supply function with bank b is as
follows:
ln(dφb ) = zb,1 + zb,2 ln[p(GDPi) + (1− p)GDPii] + zb,3[rbd(pvbi + (1− p)vbii)]
+zb,4
X
b´6=b∈B
[rb´d(pv
b´
i + (1− p)vb´ii)] (13)
where,
dφb ≡ amount of money that agent φ chooses to deposit with bank b ∈ B.
7.2.3 Households’ Loan Repayment Rates
We assume that each household’s repayment rate on his loan obligation to his
nature-selected bank in state s ∈ S is a positive function of the corresponding GDP
level as well as the aggregate credit supply in the economy. The latter variable
captures the eﬀect of ‘credit crunch’ in the economy whereby a fall in the overall
credit supply in the economy aggravates the default probability of every house-
hold.21 Specifically, the functional form of the repayment rate of household hb,
∀hb ∈ Hb, to his nature-selected bank b ∈ B, in state s ∈ S is as follows:
ln(vh
b
sb ) = ghb,s,1 + ghb,s,2 ln(GDPs) + ghb,s,3[ln(m¯
γ) + ln(m¯δ) + ln(m¯τ )] (14)
7.3 GDP
As can be seen from equations (12) to (14), we have assumed that households’ ac-
tions depend on their expected GDP in the second period. So, in this section we
endogenise GDP in both states of the second period. We assume that GDP in each
state is a positive function of the aggregate credit supply available in the previous
period. Since the Modigliani-Miller proposition does not hold in our model22, higher
credit extension as a result of loosening monetary policy, or any other shocks, gen-
erates a positive real balance eﬀect that raises consumption demand and ultimately
21Higher interest rates, given that households are liquidity constrained, ultimately increase their
debt obligations in the future. Hence, defaults rise.
22 See Goodhart et al. (2003) for an extensive discussion.
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GDP. In particular, the following functional form for GDP in state s ∈ S of the
second period (GDPs) holds.
ln(GDPs) = us,1+us,2[ln(m¯
γ)+ln(m¯δ)+ln(m¯τ )]+us,3[ln(e
γ
s )+ln(e
δ
s)+ln(e
τ
s )] (15)
7.4 Market Clearing Conditions
There are seven active markets in the model (three consumer loan, three deposit
and one interbank markets). Each of these markets determines an interest rate that
equilibrates demand and supply in equilibrium.23
1 + rb =
µh
b
mb
, hb ∈ Hb,∀b ∈ B (i.e. bank b’s loan market clears) (16)
1 + rbd =
µbd
dφb
,∀b ∈ B (i.e. bank b’s deposit market clears) (17)
1 + ρ =
µγ + µτ
M + dδ
(i.e. interbank market clears) (18)
We note that these interest rates, i.e. rb, rbd, and ρ, b ∈ B, are the ex ante nom-
inal interest rates that incorporate default premium since default is permitted in
equilibrium. Their eﬀective (ex post) interest rates have to be suitably adjusted to
account for default in their corresponding markets.24
7.5 Equilibrium
The equilibrium in this economy is characterised by a vector of all choice variables
of active agents such that banks maximise their payoﬀ function subject to their
budget constraints, all markets clear (i.e. conditions 16, 17, and 18 are satisfied),
bank δ is correct in its expectation about the repayment rates that it gets from its
interbank investment, and, finally, loan demand, deposit supply, repayments rates,
and GDP in both states s satisfy the reduced form equations (12)-(15).
8 Appendix II: Simulations
8.1 Case I: Banks face CARs
A negative shock to capital endowment
23The interest rate formation mechanism is identical to the oﬀer-for-sale mechanism in Dubey
and Shubik (1978). The denominator of each of the expressions (15-17) represents the supply side
whereas the numerator divided by (1+ r), r ∈ {rb, rbd, ρ}, b ∈ B corresponds to the demand. Note
that this interest rate formation mechanism is well-defined both in, and out of, equilibrium.
24For more on the method of calculating the ex post interest rates, see Shubik and Tsomocos
(1992).
23
We now turn to the analysis of the impact of a negative shock to the capital
endowment of bank δ in the initial period. In particular, we decrease capital by 5%
(from 35,671 to 33,890 million pounds).
Bank -9.4 -4 0.13 0.2 -4.5 -5.1 -3.8 -4.4 0.04 0.07
Bank -7.8 -3.9 0.2 0.4 0.04 0.1 0.7 0.8 -0.03 -0.03
Bank -7.8 -4 0.03 0.04 0.007 0.006 0.6 0.7 -0.02 -0.01
Table 3: % change in key variables given a negative 5% shock to bank  's capital at t=1 
Interest rates
-7.8 -0.56 -0.62
b
dr br ρ
b
iπ biiπ bie biie bik biυ biiυ iGDP iiGDPbiik
δ
γ
τ
The fall in δ’s capital endowment causes a contraction in the funds available for
loans to other banks and to households. But loan demand falls as well, as expected
GDP, which is a function, among other things, of banks’ equity value, decreases
considerably. As a result, the interest rate in the interbank market ρ and on bank
δ’s loans to households rδ decrease significantly, by 7.8% and 4% respectively (i.e.
from 4.4% to 4% the first one and from 7.5% to 8.7% the second one). The interest
rate on bank δ’s deposits also decreases.
Banks γ and τ respond to the lower expected households’ wealth (and therefore
to their higher default rates) by decreasing their lending and, as a consequence,
their demand of funds in the interbank and in the deposit markets. This causes the
interest rates in these markets to drop.
The decrease in aggregate bank lending and in the loan rates is the result of
the eﬀect on demand and supply of credit of the initial shock to capital. All banks
have less available funds: bank δ because of the fall in its own capital, the other
banks because they can borrow less in the interbank market. Also, bank δ is willing
to extend fewer loans to avoid its capital-to-asset ratio decreasing dramatically. A
second-round eﬀect on loan supply comes through the eﬀect of the fall in lending
and in bank δ’s capital on future GDP and hence in households’ repayment rates,
as it happened in the previous simulation. At the same time loan supply decreases,
demand for credit also drops considerably due to the repercussion of the lower value
of bank δ’s equity on expected GDP. This fall in demand explains the lower loan
rates.
The eﬀect of an exogenous shock to bank δ’s capital on the other key variables
presented in Table 2 can be understood by noting that banks maximise their utility
by equating the marginal benefit from profits with the marginal cost from default
and capital violation penalties. Hence, in trying to achieve maximal utility, banks
face a trade-oﬀ. On the one hand, higher profits increase banks’ utility both directly
and by raising banks’ capital-to-asset ratios. On the other hand, to obtain higher
profits, other things equal, banks need to take more risk, i.e. to increase their de-
fault rates (equivalently to decrease their repayment rates). But lower repayment
24
rates translate into higher costs in the form of higher expected default penalties.
Following a negative shock to bank δ’s capital, the default probabilities of house-
holds also increase and, as a consequence, the values of banks’ risk-weighted assets
decrease. In this simulation exercise, banks’ profits increase, as the eﬀect of lower
lending rates is oﬀset by the lower cost of funds and by banks’ lower repayment
rates. Bank δ’s capital and capital-to-asset ratio both decrease considerably in the
second period, as profits are not suﬃciently high to replenish lost capital, while the
capital holding and the capital-to-asset ratios of banks γ and τ increase.
An increase in default penalties
We now analyse the consequences of the regulator increasing the penalties on
banks who default on their debt (to depositors and other banks). We assume a 2
percent increase in both states of the world. (from 0.9 to approximately 0.92 in the
state 1 and from 1.1 to approximately 1.12 in state 2). Since defaulting is now more
costly, banks increase their repayment rates (the percentage changes of vbi and v
b
ii
are positive for all banks, as shown in Table 3). Banks’ more prudent investment
choices induce a decline in profits (and, therefore, in capital and capital to risk-
weighted asset ratios). Because banks γ and τ increase their repayment rates to
all creditors considerably, bank δ is willing to invest more in the interbank market.
As a result, the interbank rate ρ decreases. Since γ and τ are able to borrow more
and at a lower cost from the interbank market, their demand of deposits decreases
and so do their deposit rates. The overall level of aggregate credit to households
decreases as a result of the negative households’ wealth eﬀect of lower bank equity
values.
Bank -9.2 -3.3 -14.8 -27.6 -1.4 -0.9 -0.38 0.2 0.24 0.14
Bank -18 -10 -13.2 -34.4 -2.8 -8.9 -1.8 -8 0.24 0.58
Bank -18 -10 -16.9 -23.3 -3.5 -3.5 -2.6 -2.6 0.44 0.29
-3.2 -0.9 -1.5
Table 4: % change in key variables given a 2% increase in default penalties imposed on banks on 
both states of the world  
Interest rates
b
dr br ρ
b
iπ biiπ bie biie bik biυ biiυ iGDP iiGDPbiik
δ
γ
τ
A negative shock to deposit supply
The last scenario we analyse in this section refers to a negative deposit supply
shock to bank δ in the initial period. In particular, we simulate a decrease in the
deposit supply of φ with bank δ (zδ,1) of approximately 3 percent. Not surprisingly,
the changes of the variables in Table 4 are qualitatively similar to the ones resulting
from the decrease in the Central Bank’s funds injected in the interbank market,
since the shock to deposits represents a change in the overall broad money supply.
The diﬀerence is that in this case the shock is concentrated on bank δ. To maintain
its profitability, bank δ decreases its repayment rate in both states of the world.
25
Given δ’s higher probability of default, its deposit rate increases by more than the
deposit rates of the other two banks. GDP decreases significantly in both states of
the world due to lower bank credit.
Bank 9 10 0.5 0.8 0.05 0.03 3.1 3.3 -0.1 -0.1
Bank 7.9 11 0.4 1 0.09 0.27 1.7 2 0.02 -0.05
Bank 7.9 11 0.08 0.1 0.02 0.02 1.5 1.6 0.01 -0.04
Table 5: % change in key variables given a 3% increase in deposit supply to bank ℵ at t=1 
Interest rates
7.9 -0.59 -0.57
b
dr br ρ
b
iπ biiπ bie biie bik biυ biiυ iGDP iiGDPbiik
δ
γ
τ
We now present further simulation exercises based on an economy where banks
do not have to comply with capital adequacy requirements. Table 6 shows the eﬀect
of a negative shock to the capital endowment of bank δ in the initial period. In Table
7 we report the impact on key variables of a 2% increase in default penalties imposed
on banks on both states of the world and, finally, Table 8 shows the percentage
changes in key variables given a 3% decrease in the deposit supply to bank δ in the
initial period.
As already discussed, the results of this set of simulations are quite similar to the
ones conducted under the assumption that CARs are in place. A notable diﬀerence
is the eﬀect on bank profitability. When banks do face penalties for violating their
capital constraint they have a lower incentive to raise capital (through retained
earnings). Since the value of banks’ equity partly determines the level of future
output, the decrease in GDP is higher for the simulations done under the assumption
of no CARs than for the previous ones.
8.2 Case II: Banks are not constrained by CARs
In the three following tables we present the results of a negative shock to capital
endowment, an increase in default penalties and, finally, a negative shock to the
supply of deposits under the assumption that banks are not constrained by a capital
adequacy requirement.
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Bank -1.1 -4.4 -0 -0.02 -4.6 -5.2 -3.8 -4.4 0.05 0.08
Bank -9 -4.7 0 0 0.001 0.003 0.6 0.7 -0.03 -0.02
Bank -9 -4.6 -0 -0 -0 0 0.6 0.7 -0.02 -0.01
Table 6: % change in key variables given a negative 5% to bank ÷'s capital at t=1 (no CARs)
Interest rates
-9 -0.57 -0.64
b
dr br ρ
b
iπ biiπ bie biie bik biυ biiυ iGDP iiGDPbiik
δ
γ
τ
Bank -1.1 -4 -18 -22 -1.5 -0.9 -0.4 0.24 0.26 0.15
Bank -21 -12 -18 -22 -2.9 -10.7 -2 -9.8 0.26 0.6
Bank -21 -12 -18 -22 -3.5 -3.6 -2.6 -2.6 0.44 0.29
-21 -0.9 -1.7
Table 7: % change in key variables given a 2% increase in default penalties imposed on banks on both 
states of the world (no CARs)
Interest rates
b
dr br ρ
b
iπ biiπ bie biie bik biυ biiυ iGDP iiGDPbiik
δ
γ
τ
Bank 10 11 0.02 0.04 0 0 3.1 3.2 -0.1 -0.1
Bank 8.8 12 0 0 0 0 1.6 1.7 0.02 -0.02
Bank 8.8 12 -0 -0 -0 -0 1.5 1.6 0.01 -0.04
8.8 -0.6 -0.6
Table 8: % change in key variables given a 3% decrease in deposit supply to bank   at t=1 (no CARs)
Interest rates
b
dr br ρ
b
iπ biiπ bie biie bik biυ biiυ iGDP iiGDPbiik
δ
γ
τ
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9 Appendix III: Figures
Impulse-responses for 3 lag VAR of pod gdp equity inf
Errors are 5% on each side generated by Monte-Carlo with 1000 reps
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Figure 2: Impulse responses of a VAR(3) including pod, gdp, equity and inf
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Impulse-responses for 3 lag VAR of pod gdp equity inf propprice
Errors are 5% on each side generated by Monte-Carlo with 1000 reps
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Figure 3: Impulse responses of a VAR(3) including pod, gdp, equity, inf, propprice
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Impulse-responses for 3 lag VAR of pod gdp equity inf ir propprice
Errors are 5% on each side generated by Monte-Carlo with 1000 reps
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Figure 4: Impulse responses of a VAR(3) with pod, gdp, equity, inf, ir, propprice
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Figure 5: Impulse-response of GDP growth to bank POD (Korea)
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Figure 6: Impulse-response of GDP growth to bank equity index (Korea)
31
-1.5
-1
-.5
0
.5
0 2 4 6 8
sweden, pod, gdp2g
90% CI impulse response function (irf)
step
Graphs by irfname, impulse variable, and response variable
Figure 7: Impulse-response of GDP growth to bank POD (Sweden)
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Figure 8: Impulse-response of GDP growth to bank equity index (Sweden)
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Figure 9: Impulse-response of GDP growth to bank POD (Norway)
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Figure 10: Impulse-response of GDP growth to bank equity index (Norway)
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Figure 11: Impulse-response of GDP growth to bank POD (Finland)
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Figure 12: Impulse-response of GDP growth to bank equity index (Finland)
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Figure 13: Impulse-response of GDP growth to bank POD (UK)
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Figure 14: Impulse-response of GDP growth to bank equity index (UK)
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Figure 15: Impulse-response of GDP growth to bank POD (Japan)
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Figure 16: Impulse-response of GDP growth to bank equity index (Japan)
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Figure 17: Impulse-response of GDP growth to bank POD (Germany)
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Figure 18: Impulse-response of GDP growth to bank equity index (Germany)
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